SECOND DIVISION
VINSON B. PINEDA, G.R. No. 155224
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v
e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS,
ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and
ATTY. EMMANUEL MARIANO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
August
23, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition for
review is the April 30, 2002 decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68080 which modified the order[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 151,
in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D. Pineda v.
Vinson B. Pineda.
The facts follow.
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner Vinson
Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed
as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio
and Emmanuel Mariano.
During
the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a
settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights over their minor child
and the separation of their properties. The
proposal was accepted by petitioner and both parties subsequently filed a
motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by the trial
court. On November 25, 1998, the
marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared null and void.
Throughout
the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated.[3] They,
including their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and
treatments from petitioner’s dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they
billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5
million[4] which
the latter, however, refused to pay.
Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12
million[5] as “full
payment for settlement.”[6]
Still not satisfied, respondents
filed in the same trial court[7] a motion
for payment of lawyers’ fees for P50
million.[8]
On April 14, 2000, the trial court
ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2
million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to
Atty. Mariano.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000
to Atty. Mariano. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.
The issues raised in this petition are:
(1)
whether
the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the
claim for additional legal fees and
(2)
whether respondents were entitled to additional
legal fees.
First, a lawyer may enforce his right to
his fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of the main action in
which his services were rendered or in an independent suit against his client.
The former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.[9]
The Pasig
RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage was
filed, had jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal fees.
Respondents sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of
the value of the properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding was
additional payment for legal services rendered in the same case.
Second, the professional engagement between
petitioner and respondents was governed by the principle of quantum meruit which means “as much as the lawyer deserves.”[10] The recovery of attorney’s fees on this basis
is permitted, as in this case, where there is no express agreement for the
payment of attorney’s fees. Basically,
it is a legal mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from running away
with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it. In the
same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.
Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients
concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to
collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances
force lawyers to resort to it.[11]
In the case at bar, respondents’
motion for payment of their lawyers’ fees was not meant to collect what was
justly due them; the fact was, they had already been
adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top
of the generous sums and perks already given to them was an act of
unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be
reminded that they are members of an honorable profession, the primary vision
of which is justice. It is respondents’ despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds
of some people. The vernacular has a
word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession
and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere incident.[12]
Respondents’ claim for additional
legal fees was not justified. They could not charge petitioner a fee based on
percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free
products and services from petitioner’s business — all of which were not denied
by respondents — more than sufficed for the work they did. The “full payment
for settlement”[13]
should have discharged petitioner’s obligation to them.
The power of this Court to reduce or
even delete the award of attorneys’ fees cannot be denied. Lawyers are officers of the Court and they
participate in the fundamental function of administering justice.[14] When they
took their oath, they submitted themselves to the authority of the Court and
subjected their professional fees to judicial control. [15]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2002 in CA–G.R. CV No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of additional attorney’s fees in
favor of respondents is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals) and Renato C. Dacudao of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, rollo, pp. 48-57.
[2] Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151, rollo, pp. 99-102.
[3] Monthly fees and other expenses
which respondents claimed to be incidental to the case approximated P5,853,058.75, rollo, p.
16.
[4] P12.5
million to Atty. de Jesus; P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio
and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.
[5] Payments in check: a.)
To Atty. de Jesus P500,000
on December 18, 1998
P500,000
on January 25, 1999
b.)
To Atty. Mariano P30,000 on December 20, 1998
c.)
To Atty. Ambrosio P20,000 on December 11, 1998
P30,000 on December 18, 1998
P20,000 on December 22, 1998
P20,000 on January 4, 1999
[6] Per summary of fees prepared by petitioner and which was not disputed by respondents.
[7] RTC of Pasig, Branch 151.
[8] Representing 10% of the value of the properties granted to petitioner in the case for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
[9] Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Seventh Edition (2002), Rex Bookstore, Inc., p. 410, citing Palanca v. Pecson, 94 Phil. 419 (1954).
[10] Id., p. 395.
[11] Id., p. 408, citing the Comments of IBP Committee that drafted the Code, p. 112.
[12] Malecdan v. Pekas, A.C. No. 5830, 26 January 2004, 421 SCRA 7.
[13] In the amount of P1.2
million.
[14] Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 884 (1995), citing Sumaoang v. Judge, RTC, Br. XXXI, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. 78173, 26 October 1992, 215 SCRA 136.
[15] Taganas v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118746, 7 September 1995, 248 SCRA 133.